Boondoggle in the Making: The Fallacies Behind MATT Farrell’s Rail Optimism

Matt Farrell’s recent commentary in the Santa Cruz Sentinel (“Rail and trail a commitment worth the cost,” April 9, 2025) paints a rosy picture of rail transit in Santa Cruz County. He dismisses a nearly $1 billion estimate to repair or replace the branch line’s 33 bridges as typical for transportation projects and assures readers that only a “small percentage” would need to be paid locally. He presents this as a “legacy” investment that will serve future generations, comparing it to tunnel construction and freeway interchanges.

This narrative is misleading and ignores a growing body of hard evidence that rail systems like the one proposed here don’t work—not financially, not logistically, and not environmentally.

Let’s break it down.

1. The Cost Myth: “It’s Only a Billion (and Someone Else Will Pay)”

Farrell claims that large transportation projects are always expensive and that it’s no big deal. But there’s a difference between spending a billion dollars on infrastructure that people use (like Highway 1, with over 100,000 daily trips) and spending a billion dollars on something that may never carry significant ridership.

Moreover, Farrell repeats the often-cited but rarely scrutinized claim that the federal government will cover 80% of the cost. This is simply not grounded in reality. Mike Arnold, a fiscal analyst who evaluated SMART (Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit), points out that even for an actual functioning rail system, local sources had to cover over 60% of capital costs. That includes not only sales tax but also bridge tolls and other regional funding unavailable to Santa Cruz County. In our case, we lack those dedicated funding streams, and no committed federal or state funds for rail construction exist.

And this is before we even factor in:

  • Tracks

  • Stations

  • Rail vehicles

  • Quiet zones

  • Parking

  • Operating subsidies

Farrell’s optimism about outside funding is built on hope, not on fiscal precedent.

2. What About Northstar? A Cautionary Tale

Let’s look at a rail line that did get built: the Northstar Commuter Rail in Minnesota.

This 40-mile line, built for $320 million, serves a growing metro corridor with existing dual tracks and cheap, diesel rail technology. At its peak, it carried just under 800,000 riders per year—far below projections. Post-COVID, it plummeted to 77,000 annual boardings (2023). That’s roughly 300 people per weekday. In 2021, the per-rider subsidy ballooned to $173. The system takes in a few hundred thousand per year in fares while spending up to $18 million to operate.

It’s now getting ready to shut down.

And yet Northstar had significant advantages over the Santa Cruz proposal:

  • Two active tracks

  • Commuter demand to a major metro area

  • Lower capital costs

  • Existing stations and freight-compatible infrastructure

If that line failed to meet expectations, what are we doing pretending ours is viable?

3. Ridership Delusions

Farrell implies rail will pull commuters off Highway 1. Yet the RTC’s own Transit Corridors Alternatives Analysis says traffic volumes on Highway 1 are not forecasted to change due to latent demand—any decrease would simply be filled by new drivers. This is consistent with studies around the country. The myth that commuter rail fixes traffic is politically useful, but provably false.

4. Railbanking Was Always a Requirement

Railbanking has always been functionally required to build the Monterey Bay Sanctuary Scenic Trail (MBSST) as envisioned. Railbanking is the legal mechanism used across the U.S. to convert underused rail corridors into multi-use trails while preserving them for potential future rail. The RTC has delayed this decision for years, even though railbanking could have started in 2014. Now they act like it’s too late.

Whose fault is that?

5. Governance Failure

Farrell praises the RTC’s staff and elected officials. But many in the community—across political lines—see a different picture: an unelected staff guiding policy, with elected officials often rubber-stamping decisions they don’t fully understand. The RTC’s structure may work for large metropolitan regions. In a county of 270,000 people, it’s an engine of inertia, not vision.

Conclusion: Rail Sounds Nice Until You Run the Numbers

Matt Farrell sees rail as a romantic, multi-generational legacy. But romance won’t pay for a $4 billion project (a conservative extrapolation based on bridge costs and SMART’s actual spending). When you actually examine similar projects across the country—Northstar, SMART, and others—the results are clear: they’re deeply subsidized, low-ridership, and politically unsustainable.

Santa Cruz deserves better. Let’s build the trail we were promised—and avoid a legacy of fiscal regret.